IRSIN INSTITUT DE RADIOPROTECTION ET DE SÛRETÉ NUCLÉAIRE

Faire avancer la sûreté nucléaire

Approach implemented by IRSN for the assessment of periodic safety reviews on French research reactors

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- The EOLE and MINERVE research reactors
- The ORPHEE research reactor

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INTRODUCTION

■ French regulatory (law on transparency and nuclear security):
⇒PSR is required to operator every 10 years

This operator's review is composed of:

- A conformity check of the facility (with regard to safety reference files and preceding modifications)
- A safety reassessment of risks related to the facility (with safety rules changes and technical scientific advancements)
- The experience feedback of the installation and similar facilities in France and abroad

In conclusion, the operator usually identifies a list of provisions to improve the safety of his facility

INTRODUCTION

- A final report with the conclusions of PSR is submitted to the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN)
- As Technical Support Organization, IRSN critically examines this safety review and presents its conclusions and demands to a standing panel of experts (GPR) mandated by the ASN
- The ASN decides the continuation of reactor operation for ten years (towards the next PSR) and the improvements to be done on the facility (on basis of the GPR judgement)



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IRSN TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT

IRSN assessment approach

- IRSN assesses how the operator took into account for the safety review:
 - Environment changes (increase of air/road traffic, additional facilities...),
 - Regulatory changes,
 - Safety rules/approaches changes,
 - Knowledge and technical advancements,
 - ...and the state/lack of the safety demonstration <u>before</u> the PSR.
- The assessment is applied to the following aspects:
 - External and internal hazards,
 - Radiological protection of workers,
 - Reactor operation safety,
 - Fuel storage safety,
 - Handling operation safety,
 - Confinement towards the environment,
 - Radiological consequences of accidents considered in the safety assessment.
- For all topics human activities are taken into account



IRSN TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT

IRSN assessment approach

Some examples:

- New decrees which modify the rules used for fire risk analysis and impose a new safety demonstration (building resistance under fire)
- Evolution of safety rules for the definition of the seismic hazards
- New regulations for radiological protection of workers
- New approach for the safety analysis: Operating conditions analysis
- In addition to elements available in the operator report, IRSN assessment relies on:
 - Findings of the ASN safety inspections
 - Operation annual reports established by the operator (annual activities, maintenance findings, nature and quantity of gas and liquid released, worker's annual dose...)
 - Incident declarations



IRSN TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT

7 IRSN organization

IRSN

Pilot (*generalist engineer*)Experts



Assessment (≈ 18 months)

Completed with a **technical dialogue** with operator (discussions on submitted elements and additional useful information):

Formal questionnaires

Technical meetings

Visits of the installation and human activities observations Improvements and consolidation of operator safety demonstration (in case of weaknesses) by IRSN propositions:

Recommendations

(GPR)

Operating rules

Additional studies

Physical modifications and refurbishments

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From assessment to enhancing safety level





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
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- The EOLE and MINERVE research reactors
- The ORPHEE research reactor

REACTOR OPERATION ASSESSMENT

7 Two types of risks considered



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REACTOR OPERATION ASSESSMENT

Operating condition approach

Context : operating conditions analysis not performed at the design stage for operating reactors

This kind of analysis consists in :

- Identifying initiators of an accidental sequence
- Classifying accidental sequences in categories depending on their occurrence probability,
- Defining safety objectives for each category (radiological consequences and core state)
- Verifying the compliance of accidental sequences consequences with safety objectives

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This new analysis is applied by operators in recent PSR



REACTOR OPERATION ASSESSMENT

7 IRSN assessment relies on defence in depth principle

Prevention of the occurrence of postulated initiating event

- Robustness of the design with regards to external/internal hazards loadings (for example, consideration of seismic loadings)
- In-service inspections / preventive maintenance

Detection of the occurrence of postulated initiating event

- Capability and reliability of safety systems (redundancy and diversity of monitoring systems) to detect events
- Periodic tests
- Safety actions to limit damages on the reactor core
 - Capability and reliability of safety systems to lead to a safe state of the reactor (verification of safety thresholds notably by computer codes which must be "qualified" to research reactors specificities: low pressure, high cooling flow)
 - Periodic tests



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EOLE AND MINERVE REACTORS






EOLE AND MINERVE REACTORS

7 Two zero power reactors without core cooling system



EOLE reactor: critical mock-up (1 kW) for neutronic studies

MINERVE pool type reactor (100 W) to neutronic measurements



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
EOLE AND MINERVE REACTORS


7 IRSN assessment conclusion: reactors operation are safe

- A low reactivity potential imposed by operation rules (notably with a maximum super-criticality like B/2 for EOLE reactor)
- Different checks performed by workers before initiating a sub-critical approach (core configuration, control rod type...)
- At least, the sub-critical approach allows to detect (in case of a failure of previous dispositions) an abnormal core reactivity
- Calculations of reactivity accidents consequences pointed out that there is no impact on the core of each reactor even with an emergency scram failure


Main safety issues are not linked to the operation











14 MW pool-type reactor operated by the CEA

Located 20 km from Paris

Purpose

- To supply neutron beams for fundamental research
- To produce artificial radionuclides for pharmaceutical industry

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
Operation safety assessment: Cooling accidents

- Redundancy of emergency scram in case of flow loss (abnormal pressure or temperature in the core)
- Flywheels on the pumps of the primary cooling circuit ensure a sufficient flow in the core for a short time
- Then, natural convection (passive system) is sufficient to evacuate residual power (weak residual power),
- Due to the conception of the primary cooling circuit (contained in leaktight bunkers: waterblock) core uncovering is impossible.

IRSN conclusion: Core cooling is ensured for most of accidental sequences

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Operation safety assessment: Reactivity accidents Focus on the BORAX type accident (Design basis accident)



The pressure wave impacts the structures of the pool



Operation safety assessment: Reactivity accidents

- Safety requirement: avoid core uncovering in case of explosive BORAX type accident
- Assessment of the pool pressure loading in case of BORAX type accident
 - Calculations performed by IRSN with up-to-date calculation tools (modeling the fuel-water interaction)

 \Rightarrow question the conservatism of the design loading

Importance of prevention of a BORAX type accident

Importance of ultimate means available to keep the core under water

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Operation safety assessment: Reactivity accidents Assessment of prevention robustness

Identification of initiators of a BORAX type accident

Neutronic calculations performed by IRSN to evaluate reactivity insertions

simultaneous destruction of experimental devices can lead to a BORAX type accident

Assessment of initiators prevention

The operator has to revise the replacement planning of experimental devices to avoid their failure at the same time



Conclusions on reactor operation safety

Cooling accidents: appropriate prevention, detection and safety actions to limit consequences

Reactivity accidents:

- Prevention of reactivity accidents has to be improved
- It is interesting to have a well designed booster water circuit to avoid core uncovering in case of pool degradation after a BORAX accident

SUMMARY / CONCLUSION

✓IRSN assessment

- \checkmark All risks are reviewed
- ✓ Safety issues depend on reactors specific features
- ✓ Specific organization (important means and resources)
- ✓ Strong interactions with operator

Keep improving reactor safety level even after PSR
 On-site inspections

Evaluation of operator answers to ASN recommendations (PSR assessment)

Thanks for your attention

